The other day I just wanted to capture some basic Linux traceroutes but ended up troubleshooting different traceroute commands and Wireshark display anomalies. Sigh. Anyway, I just added a few Linux traceroute captures – legacy and IPv6 – to the Ultimate PCAP. Here are some details:
The other day I wanted to verify whether a service running on my Linux server was listening on IPv6 as well as IPv4. It turned out that it wasn’t that easy to answer – if at all.
Continue reading Services listening on IPv6 and IPv4 (or maybe not?)
I am currently working on a network & security training, module “OSI Layer 4 – Transport”. Therefore I made a very basic demo of a TCP and UDP connection in order to see the common “SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK” for TCP while none of them for UDP, “Follow TCP/UDP Stream” in Wireshark, and so on. I wanted to show that it’s not that complicated at all. Every common application/service simply uses these data streams to transfer data aka bytes between a client and a server.
That is: Here are the Linux commands for basic lab, a downloadable pcap, and, as always, some Wireshark screenshots:
Continue reading Basic TCP and UDP Demos w/ netcat and telnet
It’s not always this simple DNS thing such as “single query – single answer, both via UDP”. Sometimes you have some more options or bigger messages that look and behave differently on the network. For example: IP fragmentation for larger DNS answers that do not fit into a single UDP datagram (hopefully not after the DNS flag day 2020 anymore), or DNS via TCP, or some newer options within the EDNS space such as “EDNS Client Subnet” (ECS) or DNS cookies.
I won’t explain any details about those options, but I am publishing a pcap with that kind of packets along with some Wireshark screenshots. Feel free to dig into it.
Continue reading DNS Capture: UDP, TCP, IP-Fragmentation, EDNS, ECS, Cookie
… since we all can use “pool.ntp.org”? Easy answer: Many modern (security) techniques rely on accurate time. Certificate validation, two-factor authentication, backup auto-deletion, logs generation, and many more. Meanwhile, we use an unauthenticated protocol (via stateless UDP) from unauthenticated sources (NTP pool) to rely on! Really?
If you are using a couple of different NTP sources it might be not that easy for an attacker to spoof your time – though not unfeasible at all. And think about small routers with VPN endpoints and DNSSEC resolving enabled, or IoT devices such as cameras or door openers – they don’t even have a real-time clock with a battery inside. They fully rely on NTP.
This is what this blogpost series is all about. Let’s dig into it. ;)
Ich habe bei mir zu Hause die AVM FRITZ!Box als alleinigen Router abgelöst und durch eine Juniper SSG 5 Firewall ersetzt. Die FRITZ!Box ist trotzdem noch vorhanden und steht als IP-Client hinter der Firewall, primär um die Internettelefonie zu 1&1 bereitzustellen. Leider hat es etwas gedauert, bis ich die richtigen Einstellungen herausgefunden hatte, damit die Telefonie auch wirklich in beide Richtungen funktionierte.
Continue reading VoIP von FRITZ!Box über Juniper SSG Firewall